Saturday, April 30, 2005

Media Silence

The media has taken a role in our democracy, both good and ill. Unfortunately, a turn for the worse has occurred that both political persuasions dispute. The mainstream media is considered to be too conservative and too liberal by opposite sides at the same time. As long as the truth is being pursued, it shouldn't matter that much whether it's being presented with a liberal or conservative slant. However, when the press censors stories to protect the government or corporations, instead of the public interest, dangerous territory is entered.

The liberal media label itself is a concoction of the corporations that control the media. For example, though Fox is owned by a right-wing magnate, it was the leader in raising the bar for what they call liberal television. There really is a liberal media, but it consists of something else entirely, and the general public doesn't know it exists. The truth isn't getting out, often because it isn't being reported by the conglomerates. The real liberal media challenges the official story and doesn't accept things at face value; the way journalism is supposed to work.

Right now, the news is more of a tabloid show than anything else. It has become shallow and murky; the opposite of in-depth. There is the case of the fake reporter in the White House press corps. How he got his pass was never investigated, though national security may have been at risk. Questions about government interference with the media should also have been raised. The fact that this didn't become a serious news item, rather than just fodder for pundits, shows the control the right wing has over journalism today. If there truly was a mainstream liberal news media, they would be all over this one.

The consolidation of media is contributing to the decline of real journalism in the major outlets. An independent press is vital to a true democracy, yet both are vanishing before our very eyes. After the fact, we find out journalists were paid to write positive reviews for administration policies, and videos with actors instead of reporters were distributed and broadcast as real news. The General Accounting Office went so far as to call it propaganda; a bill has been introduced in the Senate to force the government to be more accountable in the future.

Entertaining us while protecting us from the facts seems to be a higher priority than telling a substantial news story. The American mainstream press failed to fully investigate the election of 2000, the mysteries of 911, the voting machine anomalies in the 2002 mid-term races, the run up to the Iraq war, the war itself, or the 2004 election debacle. These are just the most obvious abdications. We have to wonder just how deeply the media is complicit in the destruction of our national trust. For now, we must search for the truth in our own way, beyond the media silence.


Sources:


http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/blogrightscnetoped32405.pdf

http://www.buzzflash.com/contributors/05/04/con05129.html

http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/05/04/int05017.html

http://www.buzzflash.com/analysis/05/05/ana05013.html

http://www.tvnewslies.org/html/not_guilty_by_reason_of_the_pr.html

http://www.tvnewslies.org/html/invasion_coverage.html

http://www.tvnewslies.org/html/9_11_facts.html

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7520345/

http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/05/05/06_media.html

http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/05/04/16_death.html

http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/05/04/20_tyranny.html

http://www.democraticunderground.com/crisis/05/008_ep.html

http://www.resist.com.au/comments/c68.asp

http://pilger.carlton.com/

http://www.mpp.org/releases/nr20050414.html

http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-4947016,00.html

http://www.commonwonders.com/archives/col290.htm

http://commonwonders.com/archives/col293.htm

http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?itemid=18963

http://www.dailyhowler.com/dh042005.shtml

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html

http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/050605Y.shtml

http://www.rawstory.com/aexternal/conyers_iraq_letter_502

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/11574296.htm

http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000912159

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0520-10.htm

http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=711509

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/26/AR2005052601538.html

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

To: DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)